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THE CESSION OF FLORIDA AND JOHN
QUINCY ADAMS, SECRETARY
OF STATE, U. S. A. *
by LESTER  HARRIS
HE CESSION of the Floridas stands out as one of the greatest
victories in the history of American diplomacy. Ownership
of Florida insured to the United States a continuous seaboard
on the Atlantic Ocean. It led to the recognition by the United
States of the South American colonies, then in revolt against
Spain. 1 The treaty with Spain gave the United States its first
recognized claim to the western lands bordering on the Pacific
Ocean. 2 It became the basis for the acquisition of Oregon and
Washington, and parts of present day Montana and Idaho. 3
Cession led directly to the Monroe Doctrine. 4
It fixed for all time the boundary lines of the “Louisiana Pur-
chase.” Spain had theretofore refused to accept the “Purchase”
as valid and continued to claim ownership to over four hundred
thousand square miles of land west of the Mississippi River, plus
control of the river itself. Only with the cession of Florida did
Spain relinquish her right to charge “Right of Deposit” costs
against American users of the Mississippi at the Port of New
Orleans. 5
And in consequence of the stipulations contained in the IV
article, His Catholic Majesty will permit the citizens of the
United States, for the space of three years from this time, to
deposit their merchandise and effects in the port of New Or-
leans, and to export them from thence without paying any
other duty than a fair price for the hire of the stores; and
*Reprinted with changes and by permission from The Bucknell Re-
view, May, 1956.
1. John W. Foster, “A Century of American Diplomacy” (Boston and
New York, 1941), 264.
2. John Bassett Moore, “A Digest of International Law” (Government
Printing Office, Washington. 1906), I, 440.
3. Moore, op. cit., 457.      
4. Foster, op. cit., 265.
5. Treaty of Amity Settlement and Limits between the United States of
America and His Catholic Majesty, in Compiled General Laws of
Florida, V, 4820; Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the
United States (New York, 1955), 180-186.
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His Majesty promises either to continue this permission, if
he finds during that time that it is not prejudicial to the in-
terests of Spain, or if he should not agree to continue it there,
he will assign to them on another part of the banks of the
Mississippi an equivalent establishment. 6
The treaty provided for the transfer to the Union of all of the
holdings of Spain north of the 42nd parallel of north latitude
from the Arkansas River to the South Sea (Pacific Ocean). 7
When, on June 15, 1846, the United States and Great Britain
determined their northwestern boundary line, the Oregon treaty
was based, in part, upon rights flowing out of the Florida treaty
of cession. 8 Finally, the United States received a fixed south-
western boundary line - the Sabine River. 9 This line became a
factor contributing to the Mexican War. Adams argued for the
Rio Grande River boundary line, but was overruled by President
Monroe.
During the War of 1812, Great Britain, possessing a power-
ful navy, used the coasts of Florida as a base for attacks upon the
United States. Early in the year 1814, General Andrew Jackson
of the United States Army was ordered to capture Mobile Point,
then in the possession of the British. The attack was successful.
The British retired and took possession of Fort Barrancas, six
miles below Pensacola. From this point the British Commander
began organizing Creek Indians into an army to invade Louisiana.
Fort Bowyer, at the head of Mobile Bay, was held by the United
States. The British attacked the fort and were driven off. Jack-
son thereupon marched upon Pensacola, taking the town in No-
vember, 1814. Immediately thereafter, the British evacuated
Fort Barrancas. 10
United States troops remained in Florida until the signing
of the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain. Spain protested our
entry into Florida and forwarded to Washington a demand for
damages occasioned by the invasion. The claim was refused. 11
6. Samuel Flagg Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of
American Foreign Policy (New York, 1949), 305; Treaty of
Amity, Settlement and Limits; Articles 4 and 12 of Treaty of Friend-
ship of 1795.
7. Treaty of Amity, Settlement and Limits.
8. Ibid.  
9.  Ibid.   
10. Moore, op. cit., II, 402-406.
11. Moore, op. cit., II, 404-405.
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The War of 1812 convinced the United States Government
that Florida must be brought into the Union. In the hands of a
hostile power, the province would remain a menace to the nation.
The United States had been negotiating for the cession of Florida
from the year 1793. No agreement could be reached, however,
since Spain felt that Florida could always be used as a threat
against the United States if we should give aid to the South
American Colonies, then in revolt against Spain. 12
On April 16, 1817, John Quincy Adams, United States
Minister to Great Britain, was notified by President Monroe of
his appointment to the office of secretary of state. On assuming
office, the Secretary was confronted with two important problems:
a. The cession of Florida to the United States, and
b. The recognition of the independence of the revolting
Spanish colonies of South America.
Once in office, President Monroe and Secretary of State John
Quincy Adams discovered that Henry Clay had become the cham-
pion of the South American colonies, then in revolt against Spain,
and was seeking to obtain recognition of their independence by
our government. The United States, in the presidency of Madi-
son, had granted the South American colonies belligerent rights.
They had made free use of our ports in furtherance of their mili-
tary operations against Spain. In fact, the Spanish minister in
Washington was kept busy lodging complaints of our imperfect
and partial enforcement of neutrality.
To recognize their independence was to dismiss all hopes of
the cession of Florida. Clay contended that the recognition of the
Spanish-American republics ought to be delayed no longer, and
that Florida was bound in the course of events to come to us.
President Monroe, at the suggestion of Adams, refused to take
the step advised by Clay. 13
In the hands of any Foreign Power the Floridas were a
pistol pointed at the heart of the future Continental Republic.
East Florida was the butt of the pistol, Pensacola the trigger
guard and the panhandle of West Florida was the horizontal
barrel with its muzzle pressed against the nation’s life artery,
the Mississippi. 14
12. Bemis, op. cit., 302; Foster, op. cit., 261-263.
13. Foster, op. cit., 260-261.
14. Bemis, op. cit., 302.
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The treaty of cession of Florida was opposed by certain south-
ern members of Congress who insisted upon annexation of Texas
rather than Florida. Other congressmen were insisting that ‘while
the mouths of the Florida rivers should be accessible to a for-
eign naval force, there would be no security for the United
States.” “No one realized better than Jackson the significance of
the Florida pistol barrel if held against the Mississippi River by
a foreign enemy.” 15 Only with cession or capture of Florida
would “Old Man River,” the father of waters, flow unvexed to
the sea.
President Monroe, an July 25, 1818, ordered Adams to
sound out the British minister relative to immediate cooperation
with Great Britain in furthering South American independence.
Adams advised against the proposal and the idea was abandoned.
Recognition would interfere with the treaty negotiations on
Florida then in progress. 16
Throughout the period of Spanish sovereignty in Florida,
Spain was unable to control the hostile Seminole Indians inhabit-
ing the country. Settlers living on or near the Florida-Georgia
boundary line were in constant dread of attack. An outbreak be-
ing imminent, Secretary of War Calhoun, on December 26, 1817,
ordered General Jackson to Fort Scott, Georgia, for the purpose
of taking command of the United States forces, in an effort to
protect the settlers from the incursions of the Indians. Jackson
took command March 9, 1818. 17
On arrival at Fort Scott, Jackson wrote the Secretary of War,
Calhoun, that the Indians, aided by escaped Negro slaves, had de-
manded arms and ammunition of the Spanish government in aid
of their war upon the United States for possession of Fort St.
Marks, then held by Spain. The Spanish governor of Pensacola
notified Jackson that Fort St. Marks would be surrendered to the
Indians, since it could not be held by the Spanish forces then
available. 18
In answer to orders sent by Secretary of War Calhoun, Gen-
eral Jackson wrote: “Spain was bound by the Treaty of 1795 to
15. Bemis, op. cit., 332.
16. John Quincy Adams, Diary, 1794-1845 ed. by Allan Nevins (New
17.
York, 1929), 201.
Moore, op. cit., II, 403. 
18.    Idem.    
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keep the Indians at peace with the United States. They have
acknowledged their incompetency to do this, and are consequently
bound by the law of nations to yield to us all their facilities to
reduce them. Under this consideration I shall take possession of
the garrison at Fort St. Marks as a depot for my supplies, should
it be found in the hands of the Spaniards, they having supplied
the Indians, but if in the hands of the Indians, I will possess it
for the benefit of the United States, as a necessary position for me
to hold, to give peace and security to this frontier and to put a
final end to Indian warfare in the South.”
Jackson attacked and captured Fort St. Marks. Letters were
found in the fort suggesting that the Spanish government had
given aid to the Indians in the outbreak. 19
Acting upon the information found at Fort St. Marks, Jackson
moved west and captured Pensacola and Port Barrancas on May
27, 1818. Meantime, General Jackson forwarded the letters
found at Fort St. Marks to President Monroe. In answer Monroe
wrote as follows: “You must aid in procuring the documents ne-
cessary for this purpose. Those you sent do not, I am satisfied,
do justice to the cause. Your letters to the department were writ-
ten in haste, under the pressure of fatigue. If you think it proper
to authorize the Secretary or myself to correct passages, it will be
done with care.” 20
The cabinet at Washington became panic-stricken when ap-
prized of the news of Jackson’s attack upon Florida. The cap-
ture of Pensacola and Fort Barrancas was an act of war against
Spain. The cabinet was in session for three days, discussing
Jackson’s attack. Secretary of War Calhoun recommended that
Jackson be court martialed or reprimanded for exceeding his
orders. Calhoun insisted that Jackson had made war upon Spain
without the authority of Congress; hence the constitution had
been violated. President Monroe, Secretary of War Calhoun,
Secretary of Treasury Crawford, and Attorney General Wirt
ranged themselves against General Jackson. Secretary of State
Adams, however, held with Jackson, subject to the return of Pen-
sacola and Fort St. Marks to Spain. 21
19. Moore, op. cit., 403-404.
20. Marquis James, Andrew Jackson the Border Captain (Indianapolis,
1933), 317-318, 411.
21. Adams, op. cit., 199-201.
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Adams argued that the Government must support General
Jackson and confront Spain boldly because:
a. To hold him responsible for exceeding his powers is a
confession of weakness on the part of the United States
Government.
b. The disclaimer of power, in the executive, is of dangerous
example and of evil consequences.
c. There is injustice in disavowing Jackson, when in prin-
ciple he is justifiable. Everything he did was defensive;
that as such it was neither war against Spain nor violation
of the constitution. 22
The views of Secretary Adams prevailed. Jackson was hur-
riedly withdrawn from Florida. A note drawn by Adams was dis-
patched to Spain, stating that we would not hold Spain respon-
sible for the unauthorized act of its agents, in giving aid to the
Seminole Indians. Further we pleaded self-defense, since Spain
could not keep order in the territory. The reasoning was specious
but effective. Adams was leading from strength. 23
The note was approved by ex-president Jefferson, confidential
adviser of Monroe. Jefferson recommended that copies of the
note be forwarded to other European nations as a thorough vindi-
cation of the conduct and policy of the United States. Many his-
torians hold this statement to be about the ablest note of diploma-
cy ever written by an American diplomat. 24
Adams was still further to protect General Jackson, in the
Armbrister-Arbuthnot affair. These men, citizens of Britain, were
captured and executed by Jackson for having supposedly given aid
to the Indians during the outbreak. The British Foreign Minister,
Lord Castlereagh, declared afterwards to Rush, our minister to
Britain, that “had the English Government but held up its finger,
war would have been declared.” But so able and convincing
were the arguments submitted by Adams and Rush that Britain
became convinced that there was no just cause for war. 25
Through this turbulent period Adams and the Spanish Min-
ister, De Onis, negotiated for the cession of Florida. Spain offered
the province with the understanding that the United States would
22. Adams, op. cit., 199-200; Bemis, op. cit., 315.
23. Moore, op. cit., II, 403-405.
24. Adams, op. cit., 208.
25. Bemis, op. cit., 315; Foster, op. cit., 259-260.
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make no attempt to recognize the revolting colonies of Spain in
South America. This was refused. On October 24, 1818, Adams
and De Onis finally agreed upon terms of cession. The treaty
provided for mutual renunciation of financial claims. The United
States became responsible for the liquidation of all claims held by
American citizens against Spain to the extent of five million
dollars. Spain received free commerce in two Florida ports for
a period of twelve years. The United States assumed respon-
sibility for property destroyed in Florida illegally by soldiers of the
Union. On February 22, 1819, Adams and De Onis signed the
Treaty of Cession of Florida. The United States Senate con-
curred the same day. 26
On the signing of the Florida treaty of February 22, 1819,
Adams wrote as follows:
The acquisition of the Floridas has long been an object of
earnest desire to this country. The acknowledgment of a
definite line of boundary to the South (Pacific) Sea forms
a great epoch in our history. The first proposal of the negotia-
tion was MY OWN, and I trust it is now secured beyond the
reach of revocation. It was not even among our claims by the
Treaty of Independence with Great Britain. It was not among
our pretensions under the purchase of Louisiana . . . for that
gave us only the range of the Mississippi and its waters. I
first introduced it in the written proposal of 31st of October
last, and after having discussed it verablly both with Onis
and De Neuville [French minister]. It is the only peculiar
and appropriate right acquired by this treaty in the event of
its ratification. 27
Allan Nevins, editor of the Adams diary, stated that:
Adams might well congratulate himself upon this treaty with
Spain. It gave the United States the cession of Florida; we
agreed to pay Spanish claims not exceeding five million dol-
lars; and the boundaries of the Louisiana Purchase were
defined in an exceedingly satisfactory manner. The United
States did nothing more for its part than to concede the
Sabine instead of the Rio Grande as the southwestern boun-
dary; a concession which Henry Clay at once prepared to
attack. The treaty also met heavy obstacles in Madrid. 28
26. Moore, op. cit., 439-444; Treaty of Amity, Settlement and Limits.
27. Adams, op. cit., 211-212.
28. Adams, op. cit., 212 (footnote).
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After signature of the Treaty, De Onis boasted of having over-
reached Adams. He advised some friends that the land grants
set out in paragraph 8 of the Treaty were not all-inclusive, for
previous to January 24, 1818, the date on which all land grants
by Spain in Florida were to have been concluded, and on the day
following, the king had deeded to three Spanish noblemen and
to “some swindling American Land Jobbers” nearly one-third of
all the public lands of the Province, to wit, one-third of all of
East Florida (Actually, all of East Florida except the East
Coast.) 29
Henry Clay, a political opponent of Secretary Adams, heard
of the boast and immediately notified President Monroe. General
Jackson advised President Monroe to take Florida “at the mouth
of the cannon.” Adams was bitterly incensed over the trick. He
advised that troops be sent into Florida immediately and that so
much of the treaty as covered the fraudulent land grants be set
aside. Monroe refused the suggestion, despite the fact that if the
treaty had been ratified by the King of Spain, the government of
the United States would have lost title to the public lands of East
Florida, and would have been in position to exert sovereignty
only over the territory.
Ratification would have brought about:
A. Loss of revenue in land sales to American colonists
B. Settlement by Spanish citizens, thus setting up a minority
problem in Florida. 30
Fortunately for the United States, the Spanish government de-
layed ratification. Had ratification been prompt the fraudulent
land grants would have been held valid under the rule laid down
by Chief Justice Marshall in Fletcher vs. Peck, the Yazoo Land
Frauds. 31
The courts cannot inquire as to the motives prompting the
acts of the other departments of government; their knowledge
and good faith are not open to question, nor can the wisdom
or the expediency of these acts be questioned by the courts.
29. Bemis, op. cit., 336-337; Adams, op. cit., 255-56.
30. Bemis, op. cit., 350; A Diplomatic History of the United States, 195;
Foster, op. cit., 263.
31. Fletcher vs. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, Supreme Court of the U. S. 3 L.Ed.,
1 6 2 .  
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Secretary Adams promptly notified Spain that the treaty must
be accepted with the understanding that the land grants to the
noblemen, Punonrostro, De Vargas, and the Duke of Alagon, were
void. The Spanish government, in ratifying the treaty, must now
add a clause to the treaty expressly disavowing the grants. 32
When Florida seceded from the Union, the State Constitu-
tional Convention of 1861 expressly held that the courts of
Florida were never to entertain jurisdiction of any grants of land
made by the King of Spain to the above noblemen. Neither was
cognizance to be taken of any title derived from the grants. 33
Of the brilliant Spanish Minister, De Onis, Adams wrote:
It  is sufficient to say, that he looked upon the United
States with a jealousy and dislike which he was so little able
to repress that for some time his reception by the United
States was refused. His diplomatic subtlety made him, when
at last he entered on the negotiation a fit instrument of
the procrastination his instructions advised.
Adams held him to be “Cold, calculating, wily, and always con-
trolling his temper. Proud because he is a Spaniard, but supple
and cunning. Bold and over-bearing to the utmost extent to which
it is tolerated, careless of what he asserts, his morality appears to
be that of the Jesuits . . . as exposed by Pascal. He is laborious,
vigilant, and ever attentive to his duties; a man of business and
of the world.” 34
Adams had good reason to be bitter. He was considered our
greatest diplomat. His reputation was based upon a career in
diplomacy unequalled in our history. “At the age of eleven he
accompanied his father on his diplomatic mission to Europe and
early acquired a knowledge of French and German.” . . . “When
only fourteen he went to St. Petersburg, Russia, as Secretary to
our Minister, Mr. Dana.” . . . “When sixteen he served as one
of the secretaries of the American Plenipotentiaries in the making
of the Treaty of Peace and Independence between Great Britain
and the United States in 1783.” . . . “At the age of twenty-seven
he was appointed by President Washington as United States Min-
32. Moore, op. cit., V, 188-191.
33. State Constitution of Florida (1861), Art. XV: Par. 1, Compiled
General Laws of Florida, V, 4919-4920.
34. Moore, op. cit., I, 441 and footnote.
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ister to Holland,” Later he was appointed minister to Berlin,
Germany, and commissioner to Sweden.
When United States minister to Holland, Adams was ap-
pointed to head the United States Peace Delegation in the settle-
ment of the War of 1812. The Marquis of Wellesley, speaking in
the House of Lords of the American delegation, stated that the
Americans had shown an astonishing superiority over the British
delegation during the whole of the peace negotiations. Adams
was but twenty-eight years of age at the time. 35
On completion of his diplomatic duties in Europe, Adams
was elected to represent Massachusetts in the United States
Senate. During this term of office he was appointed United States
minister to Russia, serving until 1815, when he was given the
most important diplomatic office in the gift of the president, min-
ister to Great Britain. President Monroe, in 1817, called Adams
back from London to head the State Department. During this
period of office, Adams, along with Rush, then the American
minister to Great Britain, formulated our greatest pronounce-
ment in foreign relations, the Monroe Doctrine. 36
At this time the Secretary was a prominent candidate for the
presidency to succeed Monroe. He was to be opposed by Secre-
tary of War Calhoun, General Jackson, Secretary of the Treas-
ury Crawford, and Henry Clay. Ratification of the treaty in-
clusive of the fraudulent land grants would have wrecked his
political career.
De Onis returned to Spain and was appointed to the Spanish
cabinet. He now opposed ratification of the Florida Treaty on the
Theory that once the treaty was ratified the United States not only
would recognize the rebellious Spanish Colonies of South America
but had designs on the Spanish province of Texas as well. Spain
refused to ratify.
The diary of Mr. Adams explains the annoying vicissitudes
to which the negotiations were subjected. It is due to him
to say that in no portion of his diplomatic correspondence
by which the archives of the Department of State are en-
riched, did he display more vigor and at the same time less
impatience and harshness of expression than in the remark-
35. Herbert Agar, The People’s Choice (Boston, 1933), 95-96.
36. Foster, op. cit., 251; Adams, op. cit., 300-301.
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able papers which issued from him during this protracted
negotiation with Spain. 37
Secretary Adams quickly notified the government of Spain
that disavowal of a treaty, to be effective, must be prompt.
In this case, Spain waited seven months before notifying the
United States of its action in refusing to ratify the Treaty. Re-
fusal came too late. Adams insisted that De Onis had been
given full power to negotiate and conclude the treaty. “The good
faith of Spain was involved. Mr. Adams likened the situation
to the difference between a covenant to convey lands and the
deed of conveyance itself. Upon a breach of the covenant to con-
vey, Courts of Equity decree that the party who has broken the
covenant shall convey and further, shall make good to the other
party all damages which he has sustained by the breach of con-
tract.” 38
Adams insisted that the king of Spain had sent De Onis to
the United States with full powers to negotiate a treaty, and that
the king had further advised De Onis that “he would approve,
ratify and fulfill whatever may be stipulated and signed,” In fact,
Adams stated that he had evidence to the effect that De Onis un-
der his instructions from the king, “was authorized to concede
much more than he did” (to the Rio Grande). 39
Now Adams, citing Emerich de Vattel’s Le Droit des gens and
G. F. de Martens’ Summary of the Law of Nations, advised our
Minister in Spain that:
The obligation of the King of Spain, therefore in honor
and in justice, to ratify the treaty signed by the Minister,
is as perfect and unqualified as his royal promise in the
full power, and it gives the United States the right, equally
perfect, to compel the performance of that promise. 40
At this time, to avoid all danger and difficulty, princes
reserve to themselves the right of ratifying that which
has been concluded by their Minister in their name. The
full power is merely a commission cum libra. If this com-
mission were to have its full effect, it should be given with
utmost circumspection; but, as princes can be constrained
to fulfill their obligations only by force of arms, the custom
37. Moore, op. cit., I, 442-443.
38. Moore, op. cit., V, 188-190.
39. Moore, idem, V, 188-190.
40. Moore, ibid., V, 189.
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has arisen of relying upon their treaties only after they
have sanctioned and ratified them. Whatever the Minister
has concluded remaining ineffectual until ratification by
the prince, there is less danger of giving him a full power.
But to refuse, with honor, to ratify that which has been
concluded in virtue of a full power, the sovereign must have
strong and solid reasons for it, and particularly, he must
show that his minister transcended his instructions. 41
and
Everything that has been stipulated by an agent, in con-
formity to his full powers, ought to become obligatory for
the state, from the moment of signing, without even wait-
ing for the ratification, . . . except when he who is charged
with the negotiation, keeping within the compass with re-
spect to his full powers, has gone beyond his secret instruc-
tions, and consequently has rendered himself liable to
punishment, or when the other party refuses to ratify. 42
Adams admitted that under the American constitution, rati-
fication was “ordered otherwise,” for here concurrence must
be given treaties by the Senate after negotiation and approval by
the President. 43
The United States cabinet, on being notified of Spain’s dis-
avowal, thought of occupying Florida on the ground of necessity
in repelling Indian and Spanish marauders. Spain had neither the
power nor the will to keep Florida from being the starting ground
for these outrages. Crawford, Secretary of the Treasury, whose
Georgians were particularly exposed to the raids, insisted upon
occupation. President Monroe wisely decided to await the future
action of Spain. 44
Fortunately for the United States, at this time the nations of
Europe were giving aid to the Spanish king in his attempt to re-
tain his throne as against the liberals of Spain. France, Great
Britain, and Russia counseled Spain to ratify the treaty. They also
recommended that the United States pursue a conciliatory course.
In January, 1820, Spain ordered Minister Vives to Washing-
ton with instructions to temporize and delay. On arrival in the
41. Vattel, II, Chapter 12, Par. 156; Moore, op. cit., V, 185.
 42. Martens, “Summary of Law of Nations,” II, Chap. 1, Par. 3; Moore,         
op. cit., V, 185.
43. Moore, op. cit., V, 189 and U. S. Constitution, Article II-(2), Sect.
2; Par. 2.
44. Moore; ibid., I, 442-443.
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United States he immediately accused the United States of pro-
tecting piracy, carried on from our ports against Spanish ships
and Spanish property. He demanded that the United States form
no relations with the rebellious South American colonies. 45
Soon thereafter revolution broke out in Spain. A new govern-
ment was formed, and on October 5, 1820, the Spanish Parlia-
ment, in secret session, advised the cession of Florida to the
United States. Accordingly, on October 24, 1820, the king of
Spain signed the treaty ceding the provinces to the United States.
In ratifying the treaty, the King of Spain added a clause expressly
annulling the land grants heretofore held invalid by the United
States. 46  The United States Senate ratified the treaty (for the
second time) February 19, 1821. On February 22, 1821, ratifi-
cation was approved by President Monroe. 47
Within a year thereafter, on March 8, 1822, President Monroe
suggested to Congress that the Spanish colonies in South Amer-
ica be recognized as independent, and on May 4, 1822, the pres-
ident approved an act defraying the expenses of an independent
mission sent by the United States to the South American
nations. 48
On December 2, 1823, President Monroe announced the Mon-
roe Doctrine, as formulated by his Secretary of State, John
Quincy Adams :
We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable re-
lations existing between the United States and those powers,
to declare that we should consider any attempt on their
part to extend their system to any portion of this hemi-
sphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. 49
Great Britain followed the United States in recognizing the South
American nations on December 14, 1824, and gave official
notice January 1, 1825.
The Spanish diplomats were quite correct in their fears over
the cession of Florida. Transfer of the colony led directly to the
loss of all Spanish colonies of South and Central America.
45. Moore, ibid., I, 444.
46. Idem, and Compiled General Laws of Florida, V, 4827-4828.
47. Idem. 
48. Moore, op. cit., I, 85.
49. Moore, op. cit., VI, 401-404. Monroe’s Message, Dec. 2, 1823;
Adams, op. cit., footnote, 300-301.
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The United States was particularly fortunate in its leaders at
this time. President Monroe was an able diplomat in his own
right. Prior to his election to the presidency he had held the of-
fices of governor of Virginia, secretary of state, United States
minister to France, and United States minister to Great Britain.
Along with Livingston he had negotiated the Louisiana Purchase.
Of the part played by General Jackson in Florida negotiations,
Judge John Bassett Moore wrote:
In the cession of Florida, General Jackson displayed that
rare sagacity which afterwards came so singularly to his aid
in mastering not only the opposition of others, but the im-
pulse of his own passions. His personal instincts were for
a Spanish war, and so his unpublished letters, on file in
the Department of State, show. He burned with resentment
at what he considered Spanish atrocities which he thought
were all the more injurious from the feebleness of the power
by which they were upheld. He was ready to seize and occu-
py Pensacola and other posts which he thought harbored
border Indians or hostile raiders. But while thus making the
United States as uncomfortable a neighbor to Spain as he
could, underneath his correspondence with the Spanish au-
thorities lurked the suggestion, “how much better for you to
sell out.” And purchasing he urged on the administration as
far wiser, surer and cheaper than conquering. 50
Upon ratification of the treaty for the second time, Congress
passed an act implementing the treaty on March 3, 1821. A sim-
ilar act had been passed to implement the first treaty on March
3, 1819.
On March 12, 1821, President Monroe ordered Secretary of
State Adams to deliver to General Jackson the appointment of
commissioner to take possession of West Florida at Pensacola.
The ceremony took place on July 17, 1821. Colonel Robert
Butler took possession of East Florida at St. Augustine, on July
10, 1821. This letter of the President also gave Jackson the ap-
pointment of provisional governor - once surrender was com-
pleted. On July 17, 1821, the day of the ceremony at Pensacola,
Major General Andrew Jackson, holding himself to be acting
as governor of the Provinces of the Floridas and “exercising the
power of the Captain General and of the Intendant of the Island
50. Moore, op. cit., I, 441.
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of Cuba over the said provinces,” issued his first proclamation as
governor of Florida.
The Adams letter giving Jackson his appointment of commis-
sioner and governor of the “Province of the Floridas,” March
12, 1821, places the official date of the cession of Florida as Feb-
ruary 22, 1819, and not February 22, 1821, the day the treaty
was ratified for the second time. Jackson’s first proclamation
holds to the same effect. 51
On February 22, 1821, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams
made the following entry on the matter of the cession of Florida
in his diary:
I considered the signature of the treaty as the most important
event of my life. It was an event of magnitude in the history
of this Union. The apparent conclusion of the negotiation
had been greatly and unexpectedly advantageous to this
country. It had at once disconcerted and stimulated my per-
sonal antagonists and rivals. It promised well for my repu-
tation in the public opinion. Under the petals of this gar-
land of roses the Scapin, Onis, had hidden a viper. His
 mock sickness, his use of De Neuville as a tool to perpetrate
a fraud which he did not dare attempt to carry through
himself, his double dealing before and after the signature,
his fradulent declarations to me, and his shuffling equivo-
cations here and in Spain, to acquire the reputation of having
duped the President and me, were but materials in the hands
of my enemies to dose me with poison extracted from the
laurels of the treaty itself. An ambiguity of date, which I
had suffered to escape my notice at the signature of the
treaty, amply guarded against by the phraseology of the
article, but leaving room to chicanery from a mere colorable
question, was the handle upon which the King of Spain,
his rapacious favorites, and American swindling land-jobbers
in conjunction with the ratification of the treaty, while
Clay and his admirers here were snickering at the simplicity
with which I had been bamboozled by the crafty Spaniard.
The partisans of Crawford, and Crawford himself, were ex-
ulting in the same contemplation of a slur upon my sagacity,
and delighting in the supposed failure of the negotiation, be-
cause its failure brought unavoidable disgrace upon me. By
the goodness of that inscrutable Providence which entraps
dishonest artifice in its own snares. Onis divulged his trick
too soon for its success. Clay was the first to snuff the fra-
51. Compiled General Laws of Florida, V, 4827-4842.
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grance of this hopeful blasting vapor, and to waft it as his
tribute of incense to the President. The demand of a formal
declaration by Spain that the grants in question were by the
treaty null and void, completely and unequivocably obtained
at last, has thoroughly disappointed all the calculators of my
downfall by the Spanish negotiation, and left me with credit
rather augmented than impaired by the result. 52
It was Adams alone who saw the opening for a break through
to the Pacific in negotiating the cession of Florida. Oregon was
his most massive contribution to Manifest Destiny. Time has
confirmed Adams’ pardonable pride in negotiating the cession
of Florida. The treaty was the greatest diplomatic victory won by
any single individual in the history of the United States of
America. 53
52. Adams, op. cit., 254-256.
53. Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign
Policy, 339-340. On page 335 the lands ceded are described as fol-
lows: “The line began at the mouth of the Sabine River in the sea,
and continued North along the western bank of that river to the 32nd
parallel of latitude; then by a line due north to the Red River; thence
westward up the south bank of the Red River to 100 degrees west
longitude; thence across the Red River, and due north to the south
bank of the Arkansas and westward along that bank to the south in
latitude 42 degrees north; thence westward up that parallel to the
South Sea; the whole as laid down on Melish’s Map.”
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